People’s Daily’s finance vertical reported on December 21, 2025 that a new outlook from China’s CCID Research Institute projects the country’s AI industry will maintain high growth in 2026. The report expects the share of “intelligent compute” in total computing power to surpass 35%, underscoring continued state-backed expansion of AI infrastructure.
This article aggregates reporting from 2 news sources. The TL;DR is AI-generated from original reporting. Race to AGI's analysis provides editorial context on implications for AGI development.
Even without full access to the report, the headline numbers are revealing: Beijing expects China’s AI industry not just to keep growing quickly in 2026, but to shift its compute mix decisively toward ‘intelligent’ workloads. Crossing a 35% threshold for AI‑oriented compute signals that the country is committing a large chunk of scarce power, chips and capital to model training and inference rather than traditional IT. That reinforces the idea that, for China, AI is now a core industrial policy pillar on par with semiconductors and green energy. ([finance.people.com.cn](https://finance.people.com.cn/n1/2025/1221/c1004-40628651.html?utm_source=openai))
For the global race to AGI, this matters because hardware, not algorithms, is increasingly the binding constraint. Whoever controls the densest, cheapest and most reliable AI‑optimized compute gets to run the biggest experiments and deploy the widest fleets of agents. China’s push to expand intelligent compute—alongside initiatives like the “Artificial Intelligence+” action plan and national AI application bases—suggests it aims to offset Western export controls with massive domestic capacity and vertically integrated ecosystems. That raises the floor of global competition even if frontier model weights remain mostly in U.S. hands.
At the same time, a state‑driven build‑out of AI infrastructure carries familiar risks: over‑capacity, misallocation and regional imbalances in who can actually access this compute. For AGI‑oriented labs and investors outside China, the takeaway is that the competitive landscape will be shaped as much by national compute policy and energy planning as by clever model architectures.


